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Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Setting

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Diversity of speech, within the community and within the individual, presents itself as a problem in many sectors of life—in education, in national development, in transcultural communication. When those concerned with such problems seek scientific cooperation, expecting to find a body of systematic knowledge and theory, they must often be disappointed. Practical concern outpaces scientific competence.

The questions which arise from diversity of speech are questions addressed to an understanding of the functional roles of languages. They take for granted a world in which communities have a plurality of languages (or code-varieties) and in which languages have a plurality of roles, the two, codes and roles, often being related in complex and distinctive ways. In expecting to find a scientific theory of such interaction of language and social setting, one in effect expects theory based on successfully asking (at least as a start), what code is used, where and when, among whom, for what purpose and with what result, to say what, in what way; subject to what norms of interaction and of interpretation; as instances of what speech acts and genres of speaking? How do community and personal beliefs, values and practices impinge upon the use of language, and upon the acquisition of such use by children?

No such body of systematic knowledge and theory as yet exists. There is not even agreement on a mode of descriptive analysis of language in interaction with social setting, one which, being explicit and

of standard form, could ensure development of knowledge and theory through studies that are full and comparable.

The Phenomenon of Bilingualism

The phenomenon of bilingualism has been the main focus of such interest as has been shown, both in its own right and as medium of linguistic diffusion. (Dialectology in the United States until recently was mostly an abstraction of language from interaction with its immediate social setting, having primarily a geographical and reconstructive orientation of little relevance to contemporary American society.) Thus, the significant work in American linguistics during the 1950's which provides some sociolinguistic orientation to language deals with the description of bilingualism (Weinreich, 1953; Haugen, 1953, 1956).

Yet, bilingualism, it must be said, is not in itself an adequate basis for a model (or theory) of the interaction of language and social setting. From the standpoint of such a model or theory, bilingualism is neither unitary as a phenomenon, nor autonomous. The fact that two distinct languages are present in a community or in a person's communicative competence is compatible with, and may depend on, a great variety of underlying functional relationships. Conversely, it is not necessary that two distinct languages be present for the underlying functional relationships to appear.

Cases of bilingualism par excellence (as for example French and English in Canada, Welsh and English in Wales, Russian and French among pre-revolutionary Russian nobility) are salient, special cases of the general phenomena of variety in code repertoire and switching among codes. No normal person, and no normal community, is limited in repertoire to a single variety of code, to an unchanging monotony which would preclude the possibility of indicating respect, insolence, mock-seriousness, humor, role-distance, etc. by switching from one code variety to another.

Given the universality of code repertoires and of code-switching, then it does not appear decisive that the code-varieties be distinct languages (bilingualism par excellence). Relationships of social intimacy or of social distance may be signalled by switching between distinct languages (Spanish : Guarani in Paraguay), between varieties of a single language (Standard German : dialect), or between a pair of pronouns within a single variety (*tu* : *vous*). Segregation of religious activity may be marked linguistically by a language not generally intelligible because it is of foreign provenance (e.g., Latin, Arabic), or because it is a lexically marked variety of the common language (Zuni). Conversely, shift between codes may mark a shift between wholly distinct spheres of relationship and activity (Standard Norwegian : Hemnes dialect), or it may simply mark the formal status of talk within a single integral activity (e.g., Siane in New Guinea).

If the community's own theory of code repertoire and code-switching is considered, as it should be in any serious descriptive approach, matters become even more complex and interesting. Among the American Indian peoples, such as the Wishram Chinook of the Columbia River in the state of Washington, it was believed that infants knew first a special language shared with certain guardian spirits and interpretable only by men having those spirits; the *native language*, Wishram, was in native theory a second language to everyone. Furthermore, one pair of communities may strain to maintain mutual intelligibility in the face of great differences in dialect, while another pair of communities may refuse to maintain intelligibility although the differences seem minor. In native theory, then, cases indistinguishable by objective criteria of linguistic differentiation may be now monolingual, now bilingual, depending on local social relationships and attitudes.

Finally, while it is common to look for specialization in the function, elaboration and value, of a language in a bilingual situation, such specialization is merely an aspect of a universal phenomenon that must be examined in situations dominantly monolingual as well. In doing so it must be borne in mind that language is not everywhere equivalent in communicative role and social value; speaking may carry different functional loads within the communicative economies of different societies. One type of hunting and gathering society, the Paliyans of South India, "communicate very little at all times and become almost silent by the age of 40. Verbal, communicative persons are regarded as abnormal and often as offensive" (Gardner, 1966, 398). Thus the role of language in thought and culture (Whorf's question) cannot be assessed for bilinguals until the functional role of each of their languages is assessed; the same is true for monolinguals, since in different societies language may enter differentially into educational experience, the transmission of beliefs, knowledge, values, practices, the conduct of life (Hymes, 1966b).

What is needed, then, is a general theory and body of knowledge within which code-switching and diversity of code repertoire could find a natural place, and within which salient bilingualism could be properly assessed. Little of such a theory and body of knowledge now exists partly because the social scientists asking the right sort of functional questions have not had the linguistic training and insight to deal with the linguistic face of the problem, and because linguistics, the discipline central to the study of speech, has been occupied almost wholly with analysis of the structure of language as a referential code. In defining such structure as object of study, linguists have tended to dismiss or ignore the functional role. Sometimes as a matter of simplifying assumption, sometimes as a matter of principle, linguistic theory has been almost exclusively concerned with the nature of a single

homogeneous code, shared by a single homogeneous community of users, and (by implication) used in a single function, that of referential statement. There have been notable exceptions to such a view, especially among linguists of Prague and London, but only very recently has there emerged something tantamount to a movement to redress the situation. This movement has come to be called sociolinguistics, especially when it focuses attention upon language proper in relation to sociological categories, or ethnography of communication, where there is focus upon verbal art, native taxonomy of speech types and functions, and other features more typically studied by anthropologists (Whiteley, 1966). In point of fact, an adequate study of language in interaction with social setting will enlist scholars from all the social sciences in a common enterprise. Throughout this article I shall use sociolinguistics, intending by it the name of a problem area mediating among disciplines. Ultimately such a term may become redundant, if linguistics comes to accept the sociocultural dimensions of its subject-matter and its theoretical bases; one might then speak simply of linguistics (Hymes, 1964a, 1966a, ms. a.).

The Case for Sociolinguistic Description

For some of the most brilliant workers on the interaction of language and social setting, a general theory and body of knowledge is to be achieved by selecting problems that contribute directly to present linguistic theory and social theory. The mode of progress is direct action: use of multiple working hypotheses and strong constraints on relevance and verification in quite particular problems, intended to satisfy adherents of traditional linguistic theory and social theory. Studies in exotic societies are not particularly valued, since strong control over data and hypothesis-testing cannot be maintained. Information of the sort given (most often incidentally) in reports from other societies is not found to be convincing. A concern to secure reports focused on sociolinguistic information from such societies is thought pointless, since it suggests a prospect of endless descriptions that, whatever their quality and quantity, would not as such contribute to present theory.

My own view is different. I accept that intellectual tradition which since the eighteenth century has sought to understand the unity of mankind through both its ethnographic diversity and its general evolution. In that tradition a theory, whatever its logic and insight, is ultimately unsatisfying if divorced from the natural and existential world of mankind as a whole. The concern is consonant with that of Kroeber, reflecting upon Darwin:

... anthropologists ... do not yet clearly recognize the fundamental value of the humble but indispensable task of classifying—that

is, structuring—our body of knowledge, as biologists did begin to recognize it two hundred years ago (1960, 14).

One recognizes that communities differ significantly in patterns of code-repertoire, code-switching, and, generally, in the roles assigned to language. Ethnographic reports indicate differences with regard to beliefs, values, reference groups, and the like, as these impinge on the on-going system of language use and its acquisition by children. Since there is at present no systematic understanding of the ways in which communities differ in these respects, we need one. We need, in effect, a taxonomy of sociolinguistic systems.

From this standpoint, each of a variety of diverse cases may be felt to be of value in its own right, as an expression of mankind. In any case, such instances are valued as enlarging and deepening insight. We require a widely ranging series of sociolinguistic descriptions because a particular model, let alone an integrating theory, is not convincing unless it has met the test of many diverse situations, of a mass of systematic data. (Recall that Darwin's exposition of evolution was convincing for such a reason.) A taxonomy and a descriptive model are joint conditions of success.

Information from exotic societies, analyzed with the goals of taxonomy and descriptive models in mind, is in fact interdependent with detailed work in one's own society. Each may provide insight and a test of significance for the other. Thus it has been suggested that there is only a class-linked British relevance to Bernstein's sociological model of elaborated vs. restricted forms of code, governed by personal vs. positional types of social control. [Elaborated codes are largely *now-coding*, adaptive in lexicon and syntax to the ad hoc elaboration of subjective intent, whereas restricted codes are largely *then-coding*, adaptive to the reinforcement of group solidarity through conventional expression. Personal social control appeals to individual characteristics, role discretion, and motivation; positional social control bases itself on membership in categories of age, sex, status, etc.]

From the Standpoint of Taxonomy

From the standpoint of taxonomy, the model takes on a new dimension. It is found to be a valuable set of polar ideal types, applicable to the comparison of whole societies as communicative systems (see the description of Arapesh and Manus by Mead, 1937), and suggestive of new hypotheses linking socialization and adult religious experience. Among the Hopi and Zuni of the American Southwest, for instance, severe socialization pressure is initiated at about two years of age, before the child can have reasons verbally explained, and thus is necessarily experienced as positional control. Among the Wishram Chinook socialization pressure is withheld until the child can talk and have reasons verbally explained; the native view of socialization is

explicitly one of personal control through verbal means. Adult religious activity among the Hopi and Zuni is dominated by positional relationship (clan membership, etc.), and its verbal aspect is highly prescribed. Among the Wishram it is dominantly unique to each individual; the verbal aspect is private between person and guardian spirit, and interpreted by the person according to his own life experience.

Furthermore, I believe that failure to postulate a model and taxonomy of sociolinguistic systems as a goal will perpetuate a long-standing, unsatisfactory state of affairs, namely, the failure of scientific study to address itself to the unity of language and social life. This unity is rooted in the use of language in social life, in the integrity of the message as an act. Because of the common divorce of the study of language, as grammar, from the study of society, the unity does not come into view. Each of the separate specialisms abstracts from the speech act its own aspect for its own purposes. A theory of language in society, when envisaged, is usually thought of as uniting the results of such separate enterprises, institution-free grammar and grammar-free institutions. But these enterprises, having made their abstractions in quite disparate frames of reference, and never having been responsible for the study of speech acts as such, are quite incapable of supporting the act of reintegration. What from the standpoint of the actors and the community is an integral act, motivated and subject to shared rules of interpretation, remains invisible. It is both less and more than it was: less, because it lacks its own form and motivation; more, because having been dismembered according to conflicting claims of jurisdiction by specialisms, each concerned to gerrymander speech to its own taste, the parts to be fitted now overlap. The act, still lifeless, has grown grotesque. All approaches in which the relation between language and social life is regarded wholly as a matter of correlation, or of variation, are vitiated by the implicit assumption that integration is a matter of post-hoc putting together of separate results, none obtained with the integral object in view.

In short, there must be a study of speaking that seeks to determine the native system and theory of speaking; whose aim is to describe the communicative competence that enables a member of the community to know when to speak and when to remain silent, which code to use, when, where and to whom, etc. (This view is an application of speaking of the general view of ethnography as the construction of descriptive theory that has been elaborated by Goodenough, Conklin, Frake, Sturtevant, myself and others; for its application to speaking, cf. Hymes 1962, 1964b, 1964c, and ms. b.)

In considering what form sociolinguistic description might take, and what form an integrated theory of such description might take, one needs to show sociologists, linguists, ethnographers and others a way to *see* data as the interaction of language and social setting. The need for this is clear from the frequency with which researchers have

had informal field experience of great sociolinguistic interest, but, lacking precedent and format for its presentation, have let the information lie fallow as at best a matter for anecdotes.

Only a specific, formal mode of description can guarantee the continuation of the present interest in sociolinguistics. Such interest is sustained more by fashion and practical issues, perhaps, than by scientific conviction and accomplishment. It was the development of a specific mode of description that ensured the success of linguistics as an independent discipline in the United States in the twentieth century, and the lack of it that led to the decline and peripheral status of folklore, both having started from a similar base, i.e., the interlocking interest of anthropologists and humanistic scholars in language, in the one case, verbal tradition, in the other.

Such a goal is of concern to practical and applied work as well as to scientific theory. When a problem of bilingualism is to be studied, for example, the components of speaking that are taken into account will depend upon a model, implicit if not explicit, of the interaction of language with social setting. The significance attached to what is found will vary with the understanding of what is possible, what universal, what rare, what linked, in a comparative perspective. What survey-researchers need to know linguistically about a community, in selecting the code of questioning, and in conducting questioning, is in effect an application of the community's sociolinguistic description. In turn, practical work, if conducted with the needs of taxonomy and theory in mind, can make a special contribution, for it must deal directly with the interaction of language and social setting, and so provide for a test of the relation between theory and practice.

The goal of sociolinguistic description can be put in terms of the present situation in the disciplines whose interests converge in sociolinguistics. Whatever his questions about language, a linguist is clear that there is an enterprise, description of languages, which is central and prerequisite. Whatever his questions about society and culture, a sociologist or an anthropologist is clear that there is an enterprise (whether called ethnography, social structure, social organization) that is concerned with the concepts and methods prerequisite to particular studies and answers, a system that provides a coherent, general guide to inquiry. In other words, such workers understand what it means to describe a language, a social system or the culture of a community. We need to be able to say the same sort of thing, i.e., what it means to describe a sociolinguistic system.

Toward a Descriptive Theory . . .

Sociolinguistic systems may be considered at the level of national states, and indeed, of the emerging world society. The concern of this

paper is with sociolinguistic systems at the level of the speech economies of individual communities. The interaction of language with social setting is viewed first of all as a matter of human action and of the knowledge, sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious, that enables persons to use language in social life. Larger systems, it is true, may have properties not reducible to those of the speaking competence of persons, just as the world economy has properties not reducible to those of the economies of nations, communities or persons. Such competence, however, underlies communicative conduct, not only within communities, but in encounters between them. Whenever a larger system is dependent upon communication among persons, then the point of departure is persons. The speaking competence of persons may be seen as entering into a series of systems of encounters at levels of different scope. The considerations to be advanced here apply in principle to analysis of any social relationship in which norms of communicative conduct entailing speech have arisen. The examples will typically be from the analysis of relationships characteristic of individual communities.

An adequate descriptive theory would provide for the analysis of individual communities by specifying the technical terms required for such analysis, and by specifying what form the analysis should take. That form would be formal (i.e., would deal with the actual forms of speaking in a wholly explicit way) and standard (in the sense of being subject to general constraints on order, interrelationship and the character of rules). However, only extended empirical work, and extended experimentation with alternative modes of statement, can show what form of descriptive theory is to be preferred. When achieved, such a theory, by providing for the explicit, standard analysis of individual systems will at the same time provide a theory of their universal features.

Some Notions with which the Theory Must Deal

Among the notions with which such a theory must deal are those of speech community, speech situation, speech act, speech event, fluent speaker, native speaker, factors (or components) of speech events, functions of speech, rules of speaking, types of speech event and act. I have sketched a partial approach to such notions, first in "The ethnography of speaking" (1964a, 33-44; 1964b). I shall not repeat the ways in which the approach has already been developed, but show how it has been modified in the course of recent work. It must be emphasized that the discussion at this stage is of a heuristic guide to the analysis of systems, and that an eventual theory will have properties that can emerge only from the results of such analyses.

The recent work has been aimed at analyzing ethnographic data so as to provide at least a preliminary taxonomy of the variety of socio-

linguistic systems that impinge upon education and the child. In socialization a child acquires not only language(s), but also sets of attitudes and habits with regard to the value and utilization of language(s). A child capable of any and all grammatical utterances, but not knowing which to use, not knowing even when to talk and when to stop, would be a cultural monstrosity. Often enough a child is confronted not only with more than one code, but also with more than one system for the use of the codes. There may be what linguists have come to call interference (Weinreich, 1953) not only between two sets of code habits, but also between two sets of habits for the use of codes.

In educational situations made complex by diversity of speech, then, whether saliently bilingual or not, one needs to understand the general patterns of communicative competence being acquired by children as background for understanding the outcome of the small fraction of communicative experience encountered by children in school. A comparative perspective may help one to understand problems of a particular case.

In the course of this work a guide to the analysis of socialization, focused on speaking, has been prepared. (Existing guides neglect speech as a variable.) In one sense, such work focuses on the acquisition of a pre-existing system of interaction of language with social setting. In a deeper sense, such work studies the whole system as viewed from the standpoint of the child.

The guide is organized from the more general to the more specific, and is consciously designed to present the acquisition of linguistic codes as but a part of the acquisition of communicative competence as a whole. Its outlines are:

A Guide to Analysis of Speech Socialization

(A.) *General Aspects of Socialization*

- I. Life cycle (the ways in which speed and language enter into the distinguishing and accomplishing of reference points in the life cycle)
- II. Learning and teaching (the place of language and speaking in native conceptions of acquisition of culture and of modes of teaching)
- III. Social control (the relative place of verbal means and verbal explanations)

(B.) *Competence in Speaking*

- IV. Speaking competence (general attitudes toward speaking in relation to valued types of person, satisfactions, normal demeanor; the system of speaking as something in which competence is acquired and evaluated; conceptions of such competence, and its place among other modes of communicative competence)

- V. Linguistic code competence (general attitudes toward knowledge of linguistic codes in relation to valued types of person, satisfactions, conduct; the repertoire of codes in the community, their uses, their order and mode of acquisition; conceptions of competence in linguistic codes, and their place among other communicative codes)

(C.) *Processes of Acquisition*

- VI. Communicative environment of the infant (what communicative behavior is directed at the infant, in what ways its behavior is interpreted as communicative, differential response to its use of communicative modalities)
- VII. Acquisition of speaking competence (conceptions of children's first speech acts, what speaking is directed at children, how their speech is responded to, conceptions of sequence of acquisition of speaking competence, of how competence comes about, what is done)
- VIII. Acquisition of linguistic code competence (conceptions of first words, of sequence of acquisition of code(s), of how it comes about, what is done)

(D.) *Generalizations, Typological Contrasts*

The detailed contents of the guide, and the practical procedures for their application to data, must be passed over here. What is directly pertinent is the effect of applying the guide on that part of the guide which sketches the analysis of sociolinguistic systems. As work continues, feedback from data continues too; but certain general formulations have been shown to be necessary and have remained stable. To these I now turn after a brief comment on the background of such efforts.

Most general treatments of language, speech, rhetoric, literature and some treatments of other topics, make assumptions, explicit or implicit, as to notions with which a descriptive theory of speaking must deal. With particular regard to the components of speech events and the functions served in them, there have been important classifications by Karl Bühler, Kenneth Burke, Roman Jakobson, Charles Morris, C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards and others. With particular regard to code repertoire in relation to social setting there are important classifications and findings in the work of Basil Bernstein (see above), Joshua A. Fishman, H. A. Gleason, Jr., John J. Gumperz, Michael Halliday, William Labov, and others. These studies provide terms and notions that may prove quite useful, and the same is true of studies of other aspects of the field of sociolinguistic description: there is much to be gained heuristically from them. It would not be to the point, however, to review such studies here with the object of picking among them, amalgamating them, or the like. While each suggests a schema that may prove useful in part or in whole, the fundamental problem—to discover the underlying communicative competence that enables members of a community to use and interpret the use of language, and

to provide a formal description that is a theory of that competence—cuts deeper than any schema so far proposed.

Concern must now be with terms as heuristic input to descriptive analyses, but just as a theory of language structure must have its universal terms (e.g., sentence, distinctive feature), so must a theory of language use. At least some of the terms now to be discussed will no doubt survive empirical revisions and permanently remain as part of the theory.

Toward a Descriptive Theory . . . *Social Units*

One must first consider the social unit of analysis. For this I adopt the common expression:

Speech Community. Speech is here taken as a surrogate for all forms of language, including writing. The necessity and primacy of the term, speech community, is that it postulates the basis of description as a social, rather than a linguistic, entity. That is, one does not start with a code and look afterward to its context. One starts with a social group and looks within it at the codes present.

Bloomfield (1933) and others have in the past reduced the notion of speech community to the notion of language. Those speaking the same language (or first language, or standard language) were defined as belonging to the same speech community, and this confusion still persists in much social science literature, a quantitative measure of frequency of interaction sometimes being appended. The present approach requires a definition that is qualitative and expressed in terms of the *use* of language. Tentatively, a speech community is defined as a community sharing both rules for the conduct and interpretation of acts of speech, and rules for the interpretation of at least one common linguistic code. The sharing of code rules is not sufficient: there are persons whose English I can interpret, but whose message escapes me. Nor is the sharing of speech rules sufficient: such sharing may characterize a *speech area* (*Sprechbund*—I owe the term to J. Neustupny), comprising several distinct speech communities, not necessarily sharing a common language, but agreeing in patterns of speaking.

The *speech field* (akin to the notion of social field) can be defined as the total range of communities within which a person's knowledge of code and speaking rules enables him to move. Within the speech field must be distinguished the *speech network*, the specific linkages of persons through code and speech rules across communities. To illustrate: one's speech community may be, effectively, a single city or portion of it; one's speech field will be delimited by one's repertoire of codes, sometimes by a single language (say to England, Canada, Australia, and the United States, given a command of English), some-

times not; one's speech network, based for example on the practice of a common profession (say, sociology), may extend across communities, the common profession providing sufficiently common rules of speech.

Obviously part of the work of definition is borne by the community, and the difficulties of defining it are here by-passed. Criteria of frequency of interaction, regularity of interaction, focus of interaction, contiguity, degree of commonality of pattern, etc., may be invoked, each perhaps representing a continuum. The essential thing is that the object of description is an integral social unit. Probably it will be useful to reserve the notion of speech community for the social unit most specifically characterized for a person by common locality and primary interaction (Gumperz, 1962, esp. 30-32). I have essentially drawn distinctions of scale and kind of linkage within Gumperz' wholly general concept of *linguistic community* which amounts to any distinguishable intercommunicating group.

Speech Situation. Within a community one readily detects many situations associated with (or masked by the absence of) speech. Such contexts of situation will often be naturally described as ceremonies, fights, hunts, meals, love-making and the like. It would not be profitable to convert such situations *en masse* into parts of a sociolinguistic description, by the simple expedient of relabelling them in terms of speech. (Notice that the distinctions made with regard to speech community are not identical with the concepts of a general communicative approach, which must note the differential range of communication by speech, film, art object, music.) Such situations may enter as contexts into the statement of rules of speaking as aspects of setting (or of genre). In contrast to speech events, they are not in themselves governed by such rules, or one set of such rules throughout. A hunt, for example, may comprise both verbal and nonverbal events, and the verbal events may be of more than one type.

In a sociolinguistic description, then, it is necessary to deal with activities which are in some recognizable way bounded or integral. From the standpoint of general social description they may be registered as ceremonies, fishing trips, and the like; from particular standpoints they may be regarded as political, aesthetic, etc., situations, which serve as contexts for the manifestation of political, aesthetic, etc., activity. From the sociolinguistic standpoint they may be regarded as speech situations.

Speech Event. The term speech event will be restricted to activities, or aspects of activities, that are directly governed by rules for the use of speech. An event may consist of a single speech act, but will often comprise several. Just as an occurrence of a noun may at the same time be the whole of a noun phrase and the whole of a sentence (e.g., Fire!), so a speech act may be the whole of a speech event, and of a speech situation (say, a rite consisting of a single prayer, itself a

single invocation). More often, however, one will find a difference in magnitude: a party (speech situation), a conversation during the party (speech event), a joke within the conversation (speech act). It is of speech events and speech acts that one writes formal rules for their occurrence and characteristics. Notice that the same type of speech act may recur in different types of speech event, and the same type of speech event in different contexts of situation. Thus, a joke (speech act) may be embedded in a private conversation, a lecture, a formal introduction. A private conversation may occur in the context of a party, a memorial service, a pause in changing sides in a tennis match.

Speech Act. The speech act is the minimal term of the set being discussed, as the remarks on speech events have shown. The work on speech acts inspired by British philosophers such as the late J. L. Austin provides many helpful indications of the types of speech acts and the relationships among them. It also contributes to the task of determining for English the membership and meaning of native sets of terms for speech acts.

Toward a Descriptive Theory . . . *Components of Speech*

In discovering the native system of speaking, certain familiar guidelines may be mentioned. One must determine the native taxonomy of terms as an essential although never perfect guide. A shift in any of the components of speaking may mark the operation of a rule (e.g., from normal to another tone of voice, from one code to another). Correction, embarrassment, withdrawal and other negative responses may indicate the violation of a rule. There may also be positive evaluation (more in some groups than others) of effective use of speech and its rules.

One must have in addition some schema for the components of speech events. Traditional in our culture is the three-fold one of speaker, hearer and thing spoken about. That has been elaborated upon in various ways, e.g., in information theory. Work with ethnographic data, however, has shown the necessity of a somewhat more detailed schema. The constraints on such a heuristic guide are that it should be ample enough to handle data without arbitrariness, yet compact enough to be kept in mind for use. Being heuristic, rather than at present a theory, there is no harm and a definite advantage in organizing the schema as a mnemonic device. It so happens that in English the letters of the term SPEAKING itself can be used rather naturally for this purpose. (That the analysis of components is not language-bound, determined by the accidents of spelling, can be shown by the possibility of alternative keywords, were the spelling different. Thus what below is I[nstrumentalities] could as well be M[ean], A[gen-

cies]; what below is K[ey] could as well be T[one], M[anner], W[ay], H[ow]; etc. Changes of terminology, rather than exact translation, may permit an analogous mnemonic device in other languages. (In French, for example, PARLANT could be adapted to the purpose, as will be shown below.)

The criterion for registering a component is that it should be part of the definition of a rule of speaking. Rules of speaking, in other words, entail structured relationships among two or more components.

Organized in terms of the English code-word, components are:

(S) *Setting, or Scene*. By setting is intended of course time, and place, of a speech event. In addition, psychological setting, and cultural definition of the setting as a certain type of *scene*, may be implicated here, as when, within a play on the same stage, during the same performance, the dramatic time or place shifts: "ten years later", "a battlefield in France". The types of scene defined by a society may be basic to an analysis of speech events and the role of speaking. For example, among the Subanun of the Philippines, described by Charles O. Frake (ms.), there is a basic division into festive and nonfestive scenes. Thus, the character of Subanun litigation derives from its occurrence in festive scenes and the verbal art appropriate to them. A frequent type of rule is one in which a form of speech act is dependent on an appropriate scene; of equal importance is the use of speech acts or the choice of code to define scenes as appropriate.

(P) *Participants or Personnel*. Schemes of components usually distinguish Speaker and Hearer (Sender and Receiver, Addressor and Addressee). From the standpoint of explicit rules for speaking, such a categorization is at once too specific and too imprecise. It is too specific in that some rules hold for a participant independent of his role as speaker or hearer. Thus, in conversations among the Abipon of Argentina, if a participant (speaker or listener) is a member of the Hocheri (warrior class), then *-in* is added to the end of every word. It is too imprecise, because societies commonly differentiate a variety of roles for participants in speech events, and these must be specified. The importance of the category of auditor or audience, as a constraint on rules of speaking has recently been emphasized by the sociologist, Allen D. Grimshaw. Among the Wishram Chinook, formal speech events are defined by the relationship between sender, or source (e.g., a chief), a repeater of the sender's words, and an audience constituted as a public; in the major Wishram speech event the addressees at crucial points are not the audience, but the spirits of the surrounding environment.

It is typically in their definitions of the presence or absence of participants in speech events (more generally, communicative events) that societies most differ. Much of religious behavior can be viewed as application of a native theory of communication, often associated with elaboration of a specific code and code-switching.

(E) *Ends*. Here an English homonymy is exploited, two types of *ends* being meant: *ends* in view (goals, purposes), and *ends* as outcomes. In one sense, intentions and effects; in another, manifest and latent functions. Previous schemata of speech events have most often not provided a place for intention and outcome. (Kenneth Burke, 1945) is the exception, perhaps because of an unconscious behaviorism. Analysis of speech events from several societies shows the category of purpose and that of outcome to be crucial to the distinguishing of varieties of event. Among the Waiwai of Venezuela, for example, the varieties of the central speech event, the *oho*-chant, are to be distinguished as to whether the purpose is a marriage-contract, a trade, a communal work-task, an invitation to a feast, or a composing of social peace after death. Rules for participants and settings vary accordingly. Among the Yakan of the Philippines a taxonomy of four levels of event focused upon speech is to be differentiated in terms of purpose and outcome. Interpreted in a linguistic mode of statement, one has:

- (a) [Focus] → [talk about a topic] / *miting*
 [Outcome] → [no special outcome]

That is, the type of speech event called *miting* has as its focus simply talk about some topic; no special outcome is expected.

- (b) [Focus] → [talk about an issue] / *qisun* ("conference")
 [Outcome] → [decision]

That is, the type of speech event called *qisun* has as its purpose simply talk about something regarded as an *issue*, as when to plant rice, when to take a trip, and a *decision* is expected as the outcome.

- (c) [Focus] → [talk about a disagreement] / *mawpakkat*
 [Outcome] → [settlement] / (negotiation)

That is, the type of speech event called *mawpakkat* has as its purpose talk about a *disagreement* involving conflicting interests, and as its expected outcome, a legally binding resolution, or *settlement*.

- (d) [Focus] → [talk about a dispute] / *hukum* (litigation)
 [Outcome] → [ruling]

That is, the type of speech event called *hukum* has as its focus a disagreement arising from a charge that an offense has been committed, and as its expected outcome, a legal ruling, based on precedent and carrying special sanctions. The Yakan examples are from a paper by Frake, *Struck by Speech*, to appear in a volume on the ethnography of communication edited by John Gumperz and myself.

As the varied wording of the Yakan account has shown, where the *focus* of a speech event requires special attention, it seems most naturally to be an aspect of this portion of the heuristic scheme. Contrast in focus is often important for comparative study. Thus litigation

among the Subanun (Philippines) has special focus on message-form, in the elaboration of verbal art, in keeping with its occurrence among Subanun festive scenes; whereas Yakan (Philippines) litigation has focus only on topical content, in keeping with its place among Yakan informal scenes.

(A) *Art Characteristics.* Here two closely linked aspects of acts of speech are grouped together: the form, and the content, of what is said. The technical terms *message-form* and *topic*, respectively, are adopted for these. One context for the distinction is in the reporting of speech events: "He prayed, saying ' . . . '" (preserving message-form) vs. "He prayed that he would get well" (preserving topic only).

Perhaps the gravest and most common defect in most reports of speech events is that it is impossible to recapture the rules for message-form. Without such rules, however, it is impossible to characterize the nature of the competence in speaking of members of the society. Commonly one reads that a certain use of language is important, even crucial to a society—gossip, for example, among the Makah Indians of northwestern Washington or among fox-hunting English aristocrats. If one does not know how to gossip correctly, one cannot be an adequate member of the group. It must, then, be possible to say of an act of speech that it does or does not fit the rules. Possibly the rules for gossip are defined entirely in terms of participants, topics and settings, and not in terms of message-form; but it seems far more likely that some forms of presenting the gossip-content are acceptable and some not. In any case it is certain that where there are genres of speech act, such as gossip, there is differential skill in their accomplishment, and such skill will include handling of the message-form.

A concern for the details of actual form strikes some as picayune and removed from humanistic and scientific importance. Such a view betrays an impatience that is a disservice both to humanistic and scientific purposes. It is precisely the failure to unite form and content in the scope of a single focus of study that has held back scientific understanding of the fundamental human skill, speaking and vitiates so many quasi-scientific attempts to prove the significance of expressive behavior through content categories alone. One can never prescribe in advance the size of signal that will be crucial to content and skill in a communicative genre. The more the genre has become a shared, meaningful expression within a group, the more likely that the crucial cues will be efficient, that is, slight in scale. If one balks at such detail, perhaps because it requires technical skills in linguistics, musicology or the like, one should face the fact that one is simply refusing to take seriously the human meaning of one's object of study and the scientific claims of one's field of inquiry.

A further consideration is that such genres which become shared, meaningful expressions within a group acquire a partial autonomy, an

inner logic of their means of expression, that conditions and sometimes even controls their content. For members of the group, then, "freedom is the recognition of necessity"; mastery of the detail and formal logic of the genre is prerequisite to personal expression. Again serious concern for the human meaning of such genres requires analysis that goes beyond gross content to precise, explicit statement of the rules and features of the form.

While such a perspective may seem to apply first of all to genres recognized as conventionally aesthetic, it applies as well to conversation in daily life. Only the most painstaking analysis of form (similar to that of literary criticism) can reveal the fantastic depth and adequacy of the elliptical art that is talk.

(K) *Key*. This component is introduced to distinguish the tone, manner or spirit in which an act is done. Acts otherwise the same as regards setting, participants, message-form and content, may differ in key, as between *mock* : *serious*; *perfunctory* : *painstaking*; and the like.

The communicative significance of key is underlined by the view that, where the two are in conflict, the manner of an act overrides the content in determining its true significance. The signalling of key may sometimes be a part of the message-form itself, but may be nonverbal such as a wink, gesture, attire, musical accompaniment.

(I) *Instrumentalities*. Here are grouped together two closely linked components, those of *Channel* and *Code*. By choice of *Channel* is understood the choice of oral, written, telegraphic, semaphore or other medium of transmission. By choice of *Code* is understood a choice at the level of distinct languages. Where the distinction is necessary, varieties within a language may be designated *subcodes*.

For the student of bilingualism, of course, rules linking choice of *Code* (or subcode) with the other components are of primary interest. Each component seems to covary with choice of code in some case or other: setting, participants, ends and outcomes, message-form and topic, key, channel and (to be cited below) norms of interaction and interpretation, and genres.

(N) *Norms of Interaction and of Interpretation*. By Norms is meant not the normative character that may attach to all rules for choice among components, but specific behaviors and proprieties that may accompany acts of speech—that one must not interrupt, for example; that normal voice must not be used except when scheduled (e.g., in church service). Here, too, may be considered shared rules for the understanding of what occurs in speech acts, e.g., as to what can be ignored or discounted.

In a thoroughgoing analysis of a community, the notion of norms of interaction would implicate the social structure—the members' categories of kinds of person (role, status and the like), and the norms of interaction obtaining between them. Analysis of these norms would be

prerequisite to adequate statement of rules governing modes of address and the symbolic import of other choices, such as choice of code (see discussion of formal rules below).

The notion of norms of interpretation implicates the belief system of a community. In the history of ethnographic analysis of language, the classic precedent is the treatment of symbolic meanings of elements of Trobrian magical formulae and ritual by Malinowski (1935), under the heading of *Dogmatic Context*. Malinowski's other rubrics for analysis are roughly related to those presented here in the following way: *Sociological Context* and *Ritual Context* subsume information as to setting, participants, ends in view and outcome, norms of interaction, higher-level aspects of genre; *Structure* reports salient patterning of the verbal form of the act or event; *Mode of recitation* reports salient characteristics of the vocal aspect of message-form.

(G) *Genres*. By Genres are meant categories or types of speech act and speech event: conversation, curse, blessing, prayer, lecture, imprecation, sales pitch, etc.

[With reference to French, the heuristic set of components might be presented in terms of PARLANT: (P) Participants; (A) Actes (form, content); (R) Raison, Resultat (= ends, outcomes); (L) Local (= setting; the English adaptation of the French word, locale); (A) Agents (channels, codes); (N) Normes; (T) Ton (= Key); Types (= Genres).]

Toward a Descriptive Theory . . . *Formal Rules*

Rules of speaking do not usually refer to all components of a speech event, and often to as few as two or three. Choice of code may be defined in terms of code and interlocutor alone; or code and topic alone; or code, interlocutor, and setting; etc. It is necessary to distinguish the entire range because in a given case any one may be defining. Moreover, a non-defining component may yet condition the success or other aspect of the outcome of a speech event.

Many generalizations about rules of speaking will take the form of statements of relationship among components. It is not yet clear that there is any priority to be assigned to particular components in such statements. So far as one can tell at present, any component may be taken as starting point, and the others viewed in relation to it. When individual societies have been well analyzed, hierarchies of precedence among components will very likely appear and be found to differ from case to case. Such differences in hierarchy of components will then be an important part of the taxonomy of sociolinguistic systems. For one group, rules of speaking will be heavily bound to setting; for another primarily to participants; for a third, perhaps to topic.

Experimentation with the form of statement of rules of speaking

has not proceeded very far. Work of Joel Sherzer and myself with some American Indian data suggests the possibility of adapting a linguistic mode of statement. In such a format, generalizations applying throughout a speech event are stated at the outset in a sort of lexicon. The sequential form of the act itself is stated in a sort of syntax by means of context-sensitive rewriting rules (Chomsky, 1965). When prose descriptions of events have been so restated, there has been a considerable gain in understanding of structure. The explicit form of statement makes demands upon description that go beyond what is usually in prose accounts. The form of the event is disengaged, as it were, from the verbal foliage obligatory in prose sentences, and can be more readily *seen*. Such formal restatement is essential, if comparative work is to proceed. One must be able to compare events within a society, and across societies, in concise and standard format. Such comparison cannot depend upon memorizing or shuffling of prose paragraphs vastly different in verbal style. And it is through some formal restatement that one can commit oneself to a precise claim as to what it is a member of a society knows in knowing how to participate in a speech act.

A grave defect in many studies which examine the interaction of language and social setting has been the failure to state precisely (a) the difference and (b) the interrelationship between values pertaining to the sociolinguistic feature, on the one hand, and the values pertaining to the social context in which it can occur.

A related defect has been failure to state precisely the difference, and the interrelationship, between the normal, ordinary, or "unmarked" value of a sociolinguistic feature, on the one hand, and the "marked," or specially loaded values, on the other. Studies of the use of a given code in multilingual situations, like studies of modes of address, may state the range of contexts in which the code can occur, appending information about its use in each, but without contrasting the effects of varying code and context. However, as the Uruguayan linguist, J. P. Rona, has insisted, sociolinguistics deals not only with linguistic facts in contexts, but with linguistic facts having social value in contexts.

Just as the linguistic sign is a relation between a linguistic form and a linguistic value (e.g., the form "dog" and meaning "dog"), so a sociolinguistic feature, such as a choice of code, is a sign, a relation between a form (here, the linguistic fact, such as a code) and a sociolinguistic value (say, respect, or formality). The set of code-varieties within a community may thus be analyzed as a semantic set. One may determine for normal contexts the dimensions of meaning along which choice of code-variety implies contrast. To complete the analysis, one must then state separately the domains—settings, role relationships or whatever—across which the normal meanings of code choice are de-

fined. Having done so, one may now state the ways in which code choice may be used to insult, to flatter, to boast—the marked, specially loaded uses—by stating the corresponding, *different* relations between code values and domain values that govern these uses.

All these relationships can take the form of linguistic rules, such as those developed by Chomsky (1965) for handling lexical elements. In effect, one specifies form, content, and context—an overt element, semantic values, and rules governing its selection in those values. Such a form of statement is no more than an elaboration of the form of statement familiar to us in dictionaries now, e.g., “reach” (form), “a tack sailed with the wind coming more or less from abeam” (semantic value), with the specification (selection rule), “*in nautical usage*”. To pursue such a form of statement in sociolinguistics, however, will have as consequence *the inseparability of sociolinguistic analysis from the full-scale analysis of social life itself*, for it is in the analysis of social life that the requisite rules of selection for sociolinguistic features are to be found and stated. (For a detailed example of this mode of analysis, see my “Quasi-Korean Modes of Address”, submitted to *Anthropological Linguistics*, with the Korean data on Richard Howell (1965), it can be shown that values of authority and intimacy assigned to the modes of address (values often assigned to choice of code in some societies) are in fact properties of the social relationships in terms of which the use of the modes of address is to be defined. The modes of address themselves form a set on a single dimension of social distance. The formal separation of the set of linguistic choices and the set of social relationships reveals the true nature of the relationship between them. For major detailed work on Speech Communities from this standpoint see Gumperz (1964) and Labov (1966).)

Such a mode of analysis permits formal treatment of many of the functions served in acts of speech. The conventional means of many such functions can indeed be analyzed as relations among components, e.g., message-form, genre and key in the case of the *-y* form of the accusative plural of masculine nouns in Polish, which has the value “solemn” in the genre of poetry, and the value “ironic, pejorative” in the genres of non-poetic speech. Functions themselves may be statable in terms of relations among components, such that poetic function, for example, may require a certain relationship among choice of code, choice of topic and message-form in a given period or society.

It would be misleading, however, to think that the definition of functions can be reduced to or derived from other components. Such a thought would be a disabling residue of behaviorist ideology. Ultimately the functions served in speech must be derived directly from the purposes and needs of human persons engaged in social action, and are what they are: talking to seduce, to stay awake, to avoid a war. The formal analysis of speaking is a means to the understanding of

human purposes and needs, and their satisfaction; it is an indispensable means, but only a means, and not that understanding itself.

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